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ABSTRACT 
The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce 
resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will 
approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone 
conclusion, the question natural ly arises as to how a firm might 
manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the 
issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable 
property rights. First, a model is developed which explains how a 
single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is 
followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular 
policy problem�the control of particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles 
region. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea of implementing a market to ration a given quantity of 
resources is by no means novel. Working examples include markets for 
taxi medallions and liquor licenses. Suggested applications for the 
use of a market approach abound in the economics literature, especially 
in the fields of air and water pollution. 1 Why has the idea of setting 
up a market in tran sferable property rights received so much attention? 
One key reason, and the reason which motivates this paper, is that such 
markets have the potential to achieve a given objective in a cost­
effective manner. Whether this potential is realized depends, among 
other things, on the design of the market and the extent to which 
individual firms can exert a significant influence on the market. 
The purpose of this paper will be to explore how the initial 
distribution of property rights can lead to inefficiencies, Section 2 
develops the basic model for the case in which one firm can influence 
the market. Section 3 considers a potential application of the model. 
The results of the theoretical analysis are then compared with the 
conventional wisdom and directions for future research are discussed in 
Section 4. 
For analytical purposes, firms are divided into two categories. 
A firm will be said to have market power if it realizes it has an 
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influence on price. A firm will not have market power if it acts as a 
price taker. The question for analysis, then, is how a single firm 
with market power might influence the market by affecting the price at 
which a commodity sells. More precisely, this essay examines how the 
pricing strategy of a firm with market power varies with changes in the 
initial distribution of property rights. 
In the static models developed below, all transactions take place 
at a single price. Restricting the model in this way permits analysis 
of a range of inefficient outcomes. This is in contrast to the 
approach taken by Coase (1960) in his seminal article, who does not 
restrict the bargaining space and, consequently, emphasizes the range 
of efficient outcomes that can result, irrespective of the initial 
endowment of property rights. 
The principal result is that the degree of inefficiency observed 
in the market is systematically related to the distribution of permits. 
For the case of one firm with market power, the results have some 
intuitive appeal. If a firm with market power would elect to buy 
permits in a competitive market (i.e. , where all firms act as if they 
were price takers), then it follows a strategy resembling that of a 
monopsonist. If it would choose to sell permits in a competitive 
market, then the firm with market power follows a strategy resembling 
that of a monopolist. These results are formalized in the next 
section. 
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2. The Basic Model 
A critical assumption underlying the competitive model is that 
firms act as if they were price takers. In the model developed below, 
it will be assumed that all firms except one are price takers. The 
basic question to be answered is how (and whether) the equilibrium 
price and quantities will vary as a function of the initial 
distribution of permits among firms. 
Consider the case of m firms with firm 1 designated as the firm 
with market power. A total of L permits are distributed to the firms, 
with the ith firm receiving Q� permits. Firms are allowed to trade 
i 
permits in a market which lasts for one period. The number of permits 
which the ith firm has after trading will be denoted by Qi. All firms 
except the market power firm are assumed to have downward sloping 
inverse demand functions for permits of the form Pi(Qi) over the region 
[0,L]. Pi represents firm i's willingness to pay. All trades in the 
market are constrained to take place at a single equilibrium price, P.
For concreteness, we shall consider the case of a classical pollution 
externality, All price-taking firms attempt to minimize the sum of 
abatement costs and permit costs. For the case of pollution, the 
assumption of downward sloping demand curves is equivalent to the 
assumption that marginal abatement costs are increasing. Let Ci(Qi) be 
the abatement cost associated with emitting Qi units. Marginal 
abatement costs, -Ci_, are assumed to be positive and increasing, which 
implies Ci_< 0 and Ci_' > 0 for i = 2, • • •  ,m. Price takers solve the 
following optimization problem: 
T 
Minimize 
Qi 
C.(Q.) + P(Q.- Q�) 
i i i i 
4 
(i=2, • • •  ,m). 
The first order condition for an interior solution is: 
Ci_(Qi) + P = O. 
(1) 
(2) 
This merely says that price takers will adjust the quantity used, Qi' 
until the marginal abatement cost equals the equilibrium price, P.2 
Equation (2) implicitly defines a demand function Qi(P) which is 
downward sloping on [0,L] for i=2, • • •  ,m. Furthermore, note that the 
number of permits the ith price-taking firm will use is independent of 
its initial allocation of permits. 
The analysis of the firm with market power is less 
straightforward. Begin by defining an abatement cost function c1CQ1) 
where Cl < 0 and Ci' > O. This says that the firm with market power 
faces increasing marginal abatement costs. Firm 1 has the power to 
pick a price which will minimize its expenditure on abatement costs and 
permits subject to the constraint that the market clears. Formally, 
the problem is to: 
Minimize 
p 
Cl(Ql) + P(Ql- Q�) 
m 
Subject to: Q1 L - LQ.(P). 
i=2 i 
Substituting the constraint into the objective function and 
differentiating yield the following first-order condition for an 
interior minimum: 
(3) 
m m 
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(-Ci - P) LQ� + (L -EQ.(P) - Q�) "'o. 
ia2 i i-=2 i 
(4) 
Equation (4) reveals that the only case in which the marginal cost of 
abatement, -Cl' will equal the equilibrium price is when firm l's 
distribution of permits just equals the amount it chooses to use. In 
effect, this says that the only way to achieve a cost-effective 
solution, where marginal abatement costs are equal for all firms, is to 
pick an initial distribution of permits for firm 1 which coincides with 
the cost-minimizing solution. 
This gives rise to the following result: 
Proposition 1: Suppose there is one firm with market power. 
If it does not receive an amount of permits 
equal to the number which it elects to use, 
then the total expenditure on abatement will 
exceed the cost-minimizing solution. 
The key point to be gleaned from the analysis is that the distribution 
of permits matters, with regard not only to equity considerations but 
also to cost. Traditional models of such markets view problems of 
permit distribution as being strictly an equity issue.3 With the 
introduction of market power, it was shown that the distribution of 
permits may also impinge on efficiency considerations. 
The next logical question to explore is how the market 
equilibrium will vary as a function of firm l's initial distribution of 
permits. Doing the necessary comparative statics yields: 
ap 
I
aqo 1 L=constant 
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1 
, m " m 2 " m 
(-Cl - P) L Q. + L Q.C. - 2 I: Q. i=2 1 i=2 1 1 i=2 1 
(5) 
The expression for the denominator is the second order condition for 
the cost minimization and will be positive if the second-order 
sufficiency condition for a minimum obtains. For example, in the case 
of linear demand curves (i.e., Qi' "'0), the expression will be 
positive. Thus, for the case when a regular interior minimum exists, a 
transfer of permits from any of the price takers to the firm with 
market power will result in an increase in the equilibrium price. An 
immediate corollary to this result is that the number of permits that 
the firm with market power uses will increase as its initial allocation 
of permits is increased. Formally, the problem is to show 
(aQ1/aQ�) > 0. By the chain rule, 
aq1 = (3
Q1) (_E_) 
Qo 
ap aqo 
1 1 
(6) 
It suffices to show (aQ1/aP) is positive. By direct substitution for 
Qi' 
ao1 
aP 
m 
ac1 - L Q. (P)) 
i=2 1 
ap 
(7) 
m , 
The expression on the right-hand side of (7) equals - LQ.(P), which is 
i=2 1 
positive, because demand curves are presumed to be negatively sloped. 
One question which arises in this model is whether there is any 
systematic relationship between the distribution of permits to the firm 
with market power and the degree of inefficiency. If inefficiency is 
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measured by the extent to which abatement costs exceed the minimum 
required to reach a stated target, then it is possible to show the 
following result: 
Proposition 2: 
* 
Let Q denote the distribution of permits 
for t!e case when permit distribution equals 
permit use for the firm with market power. 
Then inefficiency*increases both as Q� 
increasis above Q1 and as Q� decreases 
below Q1• 
The proposition is verified by determining how total cost, TC, varies 
as a function of Q�. 
The efficient solution is derived from the following 
minimization: 
m 
Minimize TC = s_ (Q1) + Ql, .... � L C.(Q.) i=2 1 1 
m 
Subject to: Ql + L Q. = L. 
i=2 1
First order conditions imply: 
, 
-Ci(Qi) • Pi(Qi) • P. (i=2, • • •  ,m) 
Differentiation of total cost with respect to Q� yields: 
(8) 
(9) 
a Tc 
aq
o 
1 
' aQ1 
= c -- + 1 aQO 1 
cl 
m 
L: 
i=2 
m aQ. 
L:-1 
i=2 '1Q
O 
1 
I 
(C. -
1 
8 
m ' 
L: c. 
i=2 
1 
m 
+ L: 
i=2 
I dQi Cl)
� aq1 
aqi 
aQ
O 
1 
' aQi c.� i aql 
The above expression can be simplified by noting: 
aqi 
0 aQ1 
�/ 
0 aq1 
" 
C
i 
(10) 
(11) 
Equation (11) is obtained by differentiating (9) with respect to Q�. 
Substituting equation (11) into (10) yields: 
'1TC 
aq
o 
1 
ap 
0 aq1 
ap 
0 aq1 
Equation (12 ) implies: 
m 
L: 
i=2 
m 
L: 
i=2 
I I 
(Ci - Cl) 
" 
Ci 
I 
I ffi 1 (-P - Cl) - .l.!'._ (P + c ) L -,, -- - 0 1 i=2 c. " aq i Ci 1 
I 
a TC 
'1Q
O 
1 
> (<) 0 as (P + c1) > (<) 0. 
(12 ) 
(13) 
Combining (13) with equation (4) yields the result that total cost 
* 
achieves a minimum at Q1 and will increase as the permit distribution 
* 
deviates from Q1 in either direction. 
In addition to determining how inefficiency varies with the 
initial distribution of permits, it is also of some interest to know 
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when the level of inefficiency can be related to observable variables 
such as the quantity of permits which are exchanged. If there is a 
single firm with market power and this firm is known, then placing 
restrictions on the demand for permits by price takers yields the 
following result: 
Proposition 3: The degree of inefficiency will increase as 
the amount the firm with market power decides 
to buy or sell increases, provided the demand 
for permits by price takers is linear, 
To see this result, first note that any price not equal to the 
competitive equilibrium price will cause efficiency losses. Second, 
note that as the deviation between the competitive equilibrium and the 
observed price increases, the degree of inefficiency increases. This 
result follows immediately from the assumption that al l firms face 
increasing marginal abatement costs. It remains to be shown that 
trading increases as the size of the deviation between the actual price 
and the competitive equilibrium price increases. 
The size of the deviation between the actual price and the 
competitive price is governed by the initial distribution of permits to 
the firm with market power, Q� . The amount of net buying, (Q1- Q�), is
also governed by Q� . At the competitive equilibrium, the firm with
k d d 0 d . . . * mar et power oes not tra e � Q1= Q1 � an a competitive price, P , 
will prevail. The deviation between the actual price and the 
competitive price, (p-p*), is an increasing function of Q� . To see 
this, it suffices to show ap/oQ� > 0 ( since p* is constant ) . The 
assumption of linear demand implies Qi' � 0 for all price takers.
Inspection of equation ( 5) reveals 3P/3Q� > 0 for this case. This
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implies that the absolute deviation in prices increases as Q� rises
* 0 0 above Q1, and as Q1 falls below Q1• 
If it can be shown that selling increases as Q� rises above Q: 
and buying increases as Q� falls below Q�, then Proposition 3 will have 
been verified. For then, increases in sel ling and increases in buying 
will be associated with larger absolute price deviations and hence, 
higher degrees of inefficiency. Formal ly, the problem is to show 
aCQ1- Q� )/aQ� < 0. The relationship between net buying and permit 
distribution is derived below: 
o(Q - Qo) 1 1 
oQO 1 
= aQ1 - - 1 
oQO 1 
m 
--L: Qi i=2 
m 
L 2 " 
m ' 
Q. c. - 2 L: q 
i=2 i i i=2 i 
- 1 < 0 (14) 
The second equality is based on substitution of equations ( 5) through 
(7). Based on the signs of Qi and Ci', it follows that 3Q1/aQ� < 1 for 
this case, which immediately yields the desired result.4 
Other analysts have considered the possibility of market power, 
but generally restrict themselves to a special case. For example, 
Ackerman et al. (1974) consider the problem for a specific hypothetical 
case, but do not deal explicitly with the effect of permit 
distribution.5 DeLucia (1974) considers a numerical example in a 
simulation of a water rights market in which the rights are auctioned .  
The firm with market power plays the role of a monopsonist, restricting 
its demand for permits in an effort to keep the permit price low. The 
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situation analyzed by DeLucia corresponds to the case when the firm 
with market power receives no yermits initially.
While concern that a firm or group of firms can influence such a 
market has been expressed, relatively little thought appears to have 
been given to exactly what is meant by market power and how to devise 
institutions which would yield a desirable set of outcomes. The simple 
model developed above reveals two essential points. First, just 
because a firm may have a large share of the permits, this does not 
necessarily mean it can influence the outcome in the permit market. 
Second, if a firm does have market power in the permit market, its 
effect on price (assuming there is one firm with market power) varies 
with its excess demand for permits. That is to say, once the potential 
for market power has been ascertained, it is a flow -- excess demand of 
the firm with market power � which determines the equilibrium.
The importance of the flow has immediate implications for market 
design. In particular, with full knowledge of demand functions, a 
central authority could effectively pick the quantity of permits it 
wanted the market power firm to use through a suitabl e initial 
allocation. The limits to the discretion of the authority would be 
dictated by two extreme cases: pure monopsony in which all permits are 
distributed to the price takers, and pure monopoly in which all permits 
are distributed to the firm with market power. 
Of course, the more realistic situation is one in which the
authority has, at most, only a crude estimate of the demand functions. 
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In this case the basic model can be applied to assess the possibilities 
for exerting market influence. The sensitivity of the results could be 
checked by varying the demand functions and the initial distribution of 
permits. This would allow the policymaker to determine if the type of 
market influence considered here is likely to pose a problem in a given 
application. 
3. A. Potential Application 
In order to apply the basic model described in Section 2, it is 
necessary to develop an operational test for identifying a firm with 
market power. How this might be done is beyond the scope of this 
paper. In the application discussed below, the firm holding the 
largest share of permits under a competitive market simulation is 
designated as the market power firm. 
To demonstrate how the basic model can be applied, the problem of 
controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region was 
selected. This problem was chosen because it appeared to be a l ikel y 
candidate for a transferable property rights scheme, and because the 
problem of market power could conceivably arise. Market simulations 
based on the assumption that firms are price takers indicate that the 
largest emitter of sulfur oxides, an electric utility, could account 
for as much as half of the total emissions, and an even higher 
proportion of emissions for which abatement technologies are known-­
i .e., controllabl� emissions.6 
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The extent of market power will in general, vary with the level 
of allowable emissions, the shape of the marginal abatement cost 
schedule for the market power firm, and the marginal abatement costs 
faced by all other firms. For this particular example, a permit will 
be defined as the right to emit one ton of sulfur oxides emissions per 
day for one day. Based on this definition, Figure 1 shows the marginal 
costs of abatement for the firm designated as the market power firm. 7 
Two curves are drawn in Figure 1, a discrete step function (based on 
the data in Hahn (198 lb) ) , and a continuous approximation which has the 
following functional form: 
, 
-c1 
= 8 8 , JOO Q-.8 66 1 
Actually, for the case of the market power firm, a continuous 
approximation is probably more reasonable because the abatement 
(15) 
strategy under consideration is the desulfurization of fuel oil or the 
purchase of lower sulfur residual fuel oil. 
A similar graph for all other firms is shown in Figure 2 which 
illustrates the derived demand for permits at any given price. The 
continuous approximation to the discrete case takes the following form: 
m � Q. (P) = 73 + 154, 000/P. 
i=2 J. 
The demand curve is based on some discrete technologies such as 
(16) 
scrubbers as well as some continuous abatement strategies such as the 
one mentioned above. The continuous approximatio n will be used for 
purposes of illustration. Note that the particular form used in (16) 
� /TON
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implies that emissions by others will be at least 73 tons per day for 
all positive permit prices. 
To compute how the initial distribution of permits affects 
prices, quantities and overall abatement, it is first necessary to 
select a value for the total number of permits. In this example the 
parameter L was set equal to 149 tons/day, an amount which will ensure 
that both state and federal standards related to sulfur oxides 
emissions and particulate sulfates will be met. Having chosen a value 
for L, it is possible to examine bow permit use varies with initial 
distribution by substituting equations (15) and (16) into equation (4 ) 
and solving. The graphical solution to the problem is shown in 
Figure 3. Note that Q1 increases as a function of Q� until a corner
solution is approached. This point corresponds to a permit 
distribution where all other firms receive an amount of permits that 
just equals their uncontrollable emissions. If all other firms receive 
an amount of permits that falls short of their uncontrollable 
emissions, then the relationship between Q1 and Q� is not unique. In
this latter case, the market power firm can reap infinite rewards by 
exploiting the perfectly inelastic part of the demand curve.8 
Prices vary widely as a function of the initial distribution of 
permits. The monopsony price is approximately 3200 dollars/ton while 
the competitive price, associated with Q� � 36, is about 3900 
dollars/ton.9 When all other firms receive permits corresponding to 
their uncontrollable emissions, the price of a permit jumps to 
approximately 21, 000 dollars/ton. The monopoly price, i.e., when 
PERMIT USE 
(Ql) 
100 
50 
0 
0 50 100 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION 
(Q�) 
FIGURE 3 
Permit Use vs. Perm it D istribut ion--Harket Power 
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Q� = L, is not well defined both in theory and in practice�in theory, 
because (16) is a hyperbola with an asymptote, and in practice, because 
of insufficient information on the value of firms and possible 
technologies that might be available for controlling so-called 
uncontrollable emissions. 
Given permit use as a function of the initial distribution of 
permits, it is then possible to estimate the total annual costs of 
abatement by integrating equations (15) and (16) .  The relationship 
between total annual abatement expenditures and the initial 
distribution of permits is shown in Figure 4. Note that abatement 
expenditures remain relatively constant (in the neighborhood of 490 
million dollars annually) until the market power firm is able to exert 
some monopoly power when it receives permits in excess of 60 tons/day 
or so. 
If the primary objective in setting up a market is to minimize 
total abatement costs, Figure 4 indicates that the policymaker should 
try to avoid a situation where the firm with market power can act as a 
monopolist. However, because of the uncertainty associated with the 
cost data, it makes sense to try to minimize the likelihood that a firm 
or group of firms will be able to induce a price-quantity equilibrium 
which departs from the competitive result in either direction. 
Alernatives for dealing with this issue are discussed in Hahn and Noll 
(1982). The theory developed in this paper indicates that the expected 
excess demand of each firm may be a critical variable over which the 
policymaker can exercise control. 
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4. Conclusions
The formal analysis in sections 2 and 3 indicates the range of 
potential outcomes that might arise when firms can exert rather 
specific types of infl uence in markets which ration a fixed suppl y of 
intermediate or final goods. There are clearl y other strategies which 
l arge firms might pursue, particularl y when the market is just getting 
under way. For example, it is quite likel y that the total number of 
permits issued and the pattern of distribution coul d be affected by the 
behavior of such firms. In the case of pol l ution rights, some firms 
might refuse to pl ay the game if they do not care for the new set of 
rules. Such actions are difficult to model expl icitl y, which is why 
the focus here has been on the potential for gain within a wel l -defined 
set of rules. Even within this setting, further research is warranted. 
One avenue for further research woul d be to extend the basic 
model to the case where two or more firms have market power. Hahn 
(198 la) has examined this issue for the case of two firms with market 
power. The resul t on cost minimization and permit distribution 
(Proposition 1) was shown to general ize. A second potentiall y fruittul 
area of research woul d be to extend the model to more than one period 
along the l ines of Stokey (198 1) , who considers a durable goods 
monopolist. Final l y, it might be useful to test the theory of the 
basic model in a smal l -group expermental setting and determine when, 
and under what types of institutions, it is supported. 
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The key result obtained here, that it 'is the pattern of excess 
demands that ultimately determines the extent to which any firm can 
influence the market, does not appear to be widely recognized. One 
reason is that many people feel that manipulation of such markets will 
not be a problem. For example, Teitenberg (1980), in surveying the 
literature on air rights markets, expresses the view that "the anti­
competitive effects of a TDP [transferable discharge permit) system are 
not likely to be very important in general.111° For several 
applications such as the one considered by DeLucia (1974) and the one 
considered by Hahn (198 la), the assumption that the market will 
approximate the competitive solution would appear to depend critically 
on how the institutions are designed. Because there is a very real 
possibility that several markets in transferable property rights could 
be subject to different kinds of systematic manipulation, there is a 
need to further explore the ramifications of such problems in theory 
and applications. 
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Footnotes 
* I would like to thank Jim Quirk, Roger Noll and Jennifer Reinganum 
for providing useful input to this effort. Any remaining errors 
are solely the responsibility of the author. 
1. Teitenberg (1980) provides a comprehensive survey of the 
application of marketable permits to the control of stationary 
source air pollution. A general list of references to potential 
applications in air and water pollution is provided in the stud y by 
Anderson et al. (1979). 
2. The assumption of increasing marginal abatement costs implies that 
the firm attains a regular minimum in solving the problem (6.1). 
3. The analysis by Montgomery (1972) is one such example. In this 
analysis, firms are assumed to be price takers. For the case of 
one pollutant, one market and a linear relationship between source 
emissions and environmental quality, Montgomery finds that the 
distribution of permits will have no effect on achieving the target 
in a cost-effective manner. 
4. Proposition 3 will also hold if (Q1-Q�) �(�_) 0 and Qi'' �(�) O. 
5. See Ackerman et al. (1974), p. 279. 
6. A more detailed discussion of the market power question can be
found in Hahn (198la), and Hahn and Noll (1982). 
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7. Further assumptions underlying the development of this data, such
as the availability of natural gas, are discussed in Hahn (198la).
8 .  In practice, such rewards would be limited by the decision of other 
firms to shut down operations. 
9. All prices and costs are given in 1977 dollars. 
10. Teitenberg (1980), p. 414. 
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